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Sensory decisions may be influenced by non-sensory information regarding reward magnitude 
or reward likelihood. Given identical sensory information, it is more optimal to choose an option 
if it is a priori more likely to be correct and hence rewarded (prior reward likelihood bias), or if 
it yields a larger reward, given that it is the correct choice (reward magnitude bias). Here, we 
investigated the ability of macaque monkeys to integrate reward magnitude and prior reward 
likelihood information into a categorical decision about stimuli with high signal strength but 
variable decision uncertainty. In the asymmetric reward magnitude condition, monkeys over-
adjusted their decision criterion such that they chose the highly rewarded alternative far more 
often than was optimal; in contrast, monkeys did not adjust their decision criterion in response 
to asymmetric reward likelihood. This finding shows that in this setting, monkeys did not adjust 
their decision criterion based on the product of reward likelihood and reward magnitude as has 
been reported to be the case in value-based decisions that do not involve decision uncertainty 
due to stimulus categorization.
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A typical example of biased sensory decision making is medical 
diagnostics: based on haptic or visual information a doctor needs 
to decide, for example, if a tumor is present or not. On the one 
hand, a random subject will be much more likely to be healthy, 
thus making the “no tumor” diagnosis almost a sure bet. On the 
other hand, failing to correctly diagnose a tumor will come at a 
much higher cost. In biased sensory decision tasks we can define 
the unconditional expected value as the product of reward (or cost) 
magnitude and the prior probability of the option being correct 
and hence rewarded. Based on this definition it can be shown that 
the optimal decision criterion which maximizes payoffs in the long 
run is a function of unconditional expected value (e.g., Green and 
Swets, 1966; Feng et al., 2009 or Materials and Methods). Hence, 
the optimal decision criterion is the same regardless of whether an 
option is a priori twice as likely to be correct, or associated with a 
reward that is twice as large.
The main finding in the field of value-based decision making 
is that the choice behavior of subjects may be approximated as a 
function of expected value. Human as well as non-human subjects 
will in general prefer the option with the largest expected value 
(matching law, e.g., Herrnstein, 1961; expected utility theory, e.g., 
Bernoulli, 1738; for systematic deviations from expected utility 
theory see e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). As subjects seem 
to be able to estimate expected value of different response options 
and change their behavior accordingly, it is tempting to assume that 
the same mechanisms may also mediate the placement of decision 
criteria in biased sensory decision tasks. If this were the case, the 
shift of decision criteria could be approximated as a function of 
unconditional expected value.
It was the aim of the present study to investigate the relation 
between unconditional expected value and decision criteria in 
biased sensory decision tasks. In particular, we wanted to test 
IntroductIon
Typical decisions depend on sensory information that is evaluated 
with respect to certain rules as well as non-sensory information 
such as reward magnitude and reward likelihood. Sensory evidence 
and non-sensory information may favor different choices. Based on 
signal detection theory it is possible to show that there is an opti-
mal way to integrate reward information by shifting the decision 
rule/criterion as a function of the unconditional expected value 
of the options (see  below). The aim of this experiment was to test 
whether macaque monkeys, one of the primary animal models of 
human decision making, integrate sensory and reward informa-
tion optimally from the point of view of signal detection theory. In 
particular, we tested whether manipulations of reward magnitude 
and reward likelihood have the same effect on the monkeys’ deci-
sion criteria as predicted by signal detection theory.
Decision making tasks can incorporate several elements: sensory 
evidence, rules, and outcome values. In value-based decision tasks 
subjects choose among options based on their payoffs which are 
learned either by instruction or experience (Sugrue et al., 2005; 
Rangel et al., 2008). In sensory decision tasks, subjects infer the 
correct choice from the sensory information which is evaluated 
with respect to a particular decision rule (Romo and Salinas, 2003; 
Schall, 2003; Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Correct choices are rewarded 
equally regardless of which option was chosen. Real decision mak-
ing, however, is oftentimes a mixture of sensory and value-based 
decision making: subjects choose between options which differ 
with respect to the rewards they offer based on sensory information 
that may help guide the decision process toward the correct choice. 
The ensuing problem which is a mixture between value-based and 
sensory decision making will be referred to as biased sensory decision 
making. In biased sensory decision tasks, the optimal choice will 
depend on both, sensory and non-sensory value information.
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monkeys had  extensive  experience with the sensory decision task 
(>12 months) and potential effects of the training procedure on 
the outcome of the experiments were minimal.
Setup
The animals performed the task in an upright primate chair 
while head-movements were restrained by a surgically implanted 
head-post. Visual stimuli were generated and controlled by a CRS 
VSG2/3F video frame buffer. Stimuli were displayed on a 60-Hz 
CRT-monitor (1280 × 1024 pixels) which was placed at a distance 
of 50 cm. For two of the animals (monkey L and C), eye position 
was recorded with a scleral search-coil (CNC Engineering, Seattle, 
WA, USA) and digitized at a rate of 500 Hz. Prior to the implanta-
tion of an eye-coil half way through the experiments, eye position 
of monkey K was monitored with an infrared camera system and 
the free eye tracking software i_rec with a temporal resolution of 
60 Hz.
BIaSed SenSory decISIon taSk
Monkeys categorized the speed of a moving random dot pattern 
as either fast or slow by making a saccade to a green and red target, 
respectively (see below or Figure 1A for more details). In the neutral 
condition, stimuli were selected such that all responses were equally 
likely to be correct and all correct responses were rewarded equally. 
On different days, we manipulated either the reward magnitudes 
associated with correct responses (reward magnitude bias) or biased 
the stimulus selection such that one of the responses had a higher 
likelihood of being correct and hence rewarded (reward likelihood 
bias). Both of these manipulations occurred in the context of a 
category bias condition during which higher reward magnitude/
likelihood depended on the categorization, e.g., the “slow” category, 
i.e., the red target, was associated with higher reward magnitude/
likelihood (see Figure 1B). Similarly, we implemented a motor 
bias condition for which higher reward magnitude/likelihood was 
associated with a particular motor response, e.g., higher reward 
magnitude/likelihood for a rightward saccade.
This gave rise to 2 (reward magnitude/likelihood) × 2(category/
motor) × 2(fast/slow for category bias or right/left for motor 
bias) = 8 different bias conditions. On a given day, a subject expe-
rienced one block of trials from the eight bias conditions embedded 
in two blocks of neutral trials: neutral (200–400 trials) – biased 
(>600 trials) – neutral (until satiated). The rational for embedding 
the biased condition in blocks of neutral trials was to examine the 
evolution of the behavioral bias from a neutral starting point. The 
reward magnitude and reward likelihood bias conditions were run 
in separate blocks of 4 days each, during which we presented the 
four possible bias conditions: “slow” and “fast” category bias as well 
as “right” and “left” motor bias.
On different blocks of 4 days we used different reward magni-
tude asymmetries: the number of valve openings (see below) for the 
favored versus the unfavored option could be either 4 to 3, 4 to 2 or 
3 to 2. In the reward likelihood condition, the favored option was 
always twice as likely to be correct than the unfavored option.
An individual trial was initiated when the subject looked at a 
yellow fixation target in the center of the monitor. After a random 
delay, a coherently moving random dot pattern appeared in a 5° 
circular window around the fixation target. At the same time, the 
whether changes of unconditional expected value have the same 
impact on decision criteria when caused by reward magnitude 
as opposed to prior reward likelihood manipulations. Our null 
hypothesis assumes that the neural network responsible for setting 
decision criteria in biased decision tasks will operate as a function 
of unconditional expected reward. In other words, we assumed that 
doubling the reward magnitude of an option has the same effect 
on decision criteria as doubling the likelihood of that option being 
correct, and hence rewarded. We speculate that neurons coding 
expected value/utility (Fiorillo et al., 2005; Tobler et al., 2005) could 
serve as the input to a network that could adjust decision criteria 
as a function of expected value/utility. Contrary to our expecta-
tions and predictions from signal detection theory, we found that 
decision criteria were only affected by manipulations of reward 
magnitude, and not by prior reward likelihood.
MaterIalS and MethodS
SuBjectS
Subjects were three male macaque monkeys (monkeys L, G, and 
C). At the time of the experiments the animals were between 5 and 
9 years old and weighted between 8 and 12 kg.
Monkey C exhibited a strong response bias even in the absence 
of any reward manipulations. As this bias was probably due to 
damage caused during previous electrophysiological recordings, 
he was excluded from the second half of the experiments. Monkeys 
were prepared for the experiments by surgical implant of a post 
for restraining head movements and a scleral search coil to moni-
tor eye-position. All methods were approved by the Institutional 
Animal Care and Use Committee at Columbia University and the 
New York State Psychiatric Institute.
traInIng and prIor experIence of the anIMalS
Our goal was to approximate the natural behavior of macaque 
monkeys in a biased decision making task. To do so we selected 
the animals according to two criteria. First, we made sure that 
our subjects were never before exposed to asymmetric reward 
magnitude or reward likelihood manipulations. Second, we used 
animals that had extensive experience (>12 months) with the sen-
sory decision task in question. This reduced the potential effects 
of training history. All of the training procedures that were used 
(see below) are standard and did not encourage a particular pat-
tern of behavior in the main experiment. In particular, we used 
standard shaping procedures to introduce the animals to the task. 
Prior to the implantation of the head-post, animals learned to touch 
a touch-screen for fluid rewards. Next, they learned to touch a 
fixation spot in order to initiate a trial and then, to touch a sin-
gle response target following the appearance of particular visual 
stimulus. Once the monkeys were comfortable with the task, we 
started introducing a second distracter target on some fraction of 
the trials. Monkeys were only rewarded for choosing the correct 
target. Once the monkeys performed well on the task with the 
distractor target (>80% correct), a head-post was implanted and 
eye-movements were tracked either with a scleral search coil or 
an infrared eye-tracker. The monkeys quickly learned to fixate a 
fixation spot for fluid rewards and switched naturally from sign-
aling their choices in the decision task with manual responses to 
eye-movements. At the time of the experiments reported here, the 
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(1200 Hz). Hence, the subjects could easily track reward magnitude 
by monitoring the number of tones. Multiple valve openings were 
separated by a pause of 100 ms. Reward delivery was aborted if 
fixation was broken even if the intended number of valve open-
ings had not been reached. The strict regulation of eye-movements 
even after the decision can be understood in the light of upcoming 
electrophysiological recordings in prefrontal cortex which is known 
to comprise neurons with strong oculomotor selectivity.
Eye movements during the task were restricted to a single sac-
cade to one of the targets after stimulus onset (choice saccade). If 
the eye left the fixation window prior to stimulus onset, the trial was 
aborted. Similarly, if the eye left the fixation window after stimulus 
onset and failed to re-fixate on one of the two saccade targets, the 
trial was considered incomplete. Incomplete trials were indicated 
by a very low tone (220 Hz) and were never rewarded. If the eye 
failed to remain on the target of the initial saccade until the auditory 
feedback was given the trial was considered revised. Revised trials 
were never rewarded and indicated by a very distinctive auditory 
event: an upward followed by a downward sinusoidal sweep.
Incomplete and revised trials were not included in the analysis. 
In addition, we excluded complete trials with unrealistically short 
and uncharacteristically long reaction times. The lower reaction 
time cutoff was set at 110 ms. The upper cutoff was chosen as 
the 97.5 percentile of the reaction time distribution of the session 
in question.
two gray potential saccade targets 7° to the left and right of the 
fixation spot turned red and green, respectively. The position of 
the red and green target to the left or right of the fixation point 
was chosen randomly. The monkeys were trained to associate slow 
speeds with the red target and fast speeds with the green target. 
Subjects signaled the outcome of the categorization process by 
making a saccade to the target with the corresponding color. The 
subjects were free to signal their choice at any time after stimulus 
onset. For each subject, the stimulus speed of a particular trial was 
drawn randomly from a set of 6–10 predetermined speeds. The 
speeds were spaced symmetrically around the cutoff speed of 5.5°/s. 
The range of speeds was adjusted for each subject individually to 
account for differences in performance.
Following a valid choice saccade (see below) and a random 
uniformly distributed delay (200–500 ms), auditory feedback was 
delivered. A high tone (880 Hz) indicated a correct response, a low 
tone (440 Hz) indicated a wrong response. If the response was cor-
rect, the subjects were required to keep fixating the target in order 
to receive the fluid reward associated with the correct response. 
The delay between the auditory feedback and the fluid reward was 
uniformly distributed between 350 and 650 ms. Reward magnitude 
was varied exclusively by changing the number of valve openings. 
The duration of an individual valve opening was constant over all 
sessions and animals and corresponded to approximately 0.07 ml 
of water. Each valve opening was accompanied by a very high tone 
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Figure 1 | Methods. (A) Macaque monkeys were trained to categorize the 
speed of moving random dots as either slow or fast relative to a criterion 
speed which was learned by trial and error. Monkeys categorized speeds by 
making a saccade to the red and green target to signal slow and fast 
speeds, respectively. (B) In the reward magnitude condition, correct 
responses were either rewarded equally or according to one of four different 
asymmetric reward schedules. Reward magnitude was manipulating by 
changing number of valve openings as indicated by the number of water 
drops. A single valve opening corresponded to approximately 0.07 ml 
of water.
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To that aim, responses were binarized, with 0 corresponding to 
“slow” and 1 to “fast” judgments. The psychometric functions were 
modeled as cumulative Gaussians with three parameters which 
described the point of subjective equality (PSE, represented by c), 
the just noticeable difference (JND, represented by σ) and lapse 
parameter λ with 0 ≤ λ < 0.5:
P s
s c
( ) ( )= + − −

λ λ σ
1 2 Φ
 
(1)
Here Φ corresponds to a Gaussian distribution function. The 
lapse parameter is thought to model trials in which the animal, for 
whatever reason, does not perform the task and randomly chooses 
a response.
Statistical significance was assessed with likelihood-ratio 
tests of appropriately constructed nested models. For example, 
to test for significant deviations of the PSE from 5.5 pix/frame 
(the actual category boundary between slow and fast speeds) 
we compared likelihood of a model in which PSE was allowed 
to vary freely with a model in which it was enforced to be equal 
to 5.5 pix/frame.
In addition, confidence intervals of the parameter estimates were 
assessed with a bootstrap procedure. To that aim we randomly gen-
erated binomially distributed responses B(n,p) for each condition, 
with n corresponding to the number of trials in a particular condi-
tion and p corresponding to the percent “fast” choices in that con-
dition. A new psychometric function was fit to this bootstrapped 
data set. This procedure was repeated 1000 times yielding a set of 
1000 parameter estimates.
SIgnal detectIon theory
Under the reasonable assumption that subjects will try to maxi-
mize reward, signal detection theory makes precise predictions 
about the shift of the decision criterion. In the following we will 
assume that the neuronal representation X of a stimulus speed s 
is variable from trial to trial, and can be represented as a Gaussian 
distribution with mean s and variance σ: X ∼ N(s,σ). Further, it 
is assumed that whenever the neuronal representation X exceeds 
a certain criterion value c, the stimulus is categorized as “fast.” 
In this setting, a bias will be represented by a change in the cri-
terion value c.
Let us assume that r
1/2
 represents the reward magnitude associ-
ated with the two choices, respectively. Let s
c
 be the actual cutoff 
speed that separates slow from fast speeds. The expected reward for 
a particular choice, e.g., “slow,” is given by the product of reward 
magnitude for this choice and the probability that this choice is 
correct. The mathematical description is given by Eq. 2:
E x r P s s X xc1 1( ) ( | )= < =  (2)
Assuming that there are only two possible stimulus speeds 
spaced symmetrically around the cutoff speed: s
1/2
 = s
c
 ± δ we can 
rewrite Eq. 2:
E r P s s
x s
x s
i
i
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2
1
2/ / /
/
= =( )
−



−


=
∑
φ
σ
φ
σ  
(3)
In addition to the decision trials described above, subjects 
 performed 10% instructed trials. In such trials the subjects did 
not have to categorize the stimulus since only a single saccade tar-
get appeared on the screen. In addition to the instructed trials, the 
monkeys also performed 10% fixation trials. During a fixation trial, 
only the saccade targets and not the random dots were presented 
on the screen. Monkeys were rewarded if they maintained fixation. 
This condition served as a control condition for electrophysiologi-
cal recordings. In the current study it had no purpose other than 
to get the monkeys accustomed to it.
The timing parameters of the task differed slightly between the 
animals. For two of the monkeys the random delay prior to stimulus 
onset was uniformly distributed. For the initial sessions of monkey 
L the delay ranged between 300 and 500 ms, for monkey C the delay 
ranged between 200 and 500 ms. For monkey K as well as for the 
later sessions of monkey L the distribution of the delays followed a 
truncated exponential distribution with a rate parameter 500 ms and 
a maximum value of 1500 ms. In addition, a fixed delay of 500 ms was 
added such that the total delay ranged between 500 and 2000 ms.
Value-BaSed decISIon taSk
In addition to the biased sensory decision task described above, sub-
jects also performed a value-based decision task. The value-based 
decision task was designed to be as similar as possible to the biased 
sensory decision task, with the following modifications: (1) The sen-
sory information (motion stimulus) was removed. Instead, subjects 
were free to choose either saccade target, but the targets were not 
always rewarded equally. Subjects were cued when to make a sac-
cade by the disappearance of the fixation spot. (2) We used a round 
and blue fixation point as well as round saccade targets to facilitate 
switching between the two tasks for the monkeys. (3) In the biased 
sensory decision task only the correct target (as determined by the 
sensory stimulus) was rewarded. The difficulty of the sensory dis-
crimination was adjusted such that to average number of correct 
responses was between 70 and 85%. Lower reward rates dramatically 
reduced the animals’ compliance. To maintain a similar reward rate 
on the value-based decision task, we set the reward probability in the 
neutral condition to 60 and 80% for monkeys K and L, respectively. 
After the first week, we were able to change the reward rate from 80 to 
60% for monkey L without losing compliance. In different sessions, 
responses were rewarded either with 3 or 4 valve openings. Within 
a single session, response magnitude never varied. A bias in favor 
of one of the response alternatives was introduced by setting the 
probability of the rewarded option to 80%, while setting that of the 
other option to 40%. (4) To encourage exploration of the alternatives 
we increased the percentage of instructed trials, i.e., trials with only 
a single response target. Initially we used 50% instructed trials. We 
changed this value to 40% after 1 week to increase the number of 
choice trials. In the biased sensory decision task, we were able to use a 
lower rate of instructed trials, because the easy trials served a similar 
purpose as the instructed trials. Except for these four differences, the 
biased sensory and the value-based decision tasks were identical.
data analySIS
In order to quantify the behavioral bias in different reward condi-
tions of the biased sensory decision task, standard psychometric 
functions were fit to the data using a maximum likelihood method. 
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σ
n
 = σ
b
. (H03) The monkeys adopt the optimal decision criterion 
in the neutral condition: PSE
n
 = 5.5 pix/frame. (H04) In the biased 
block, the monkeys adopt a decision criterion at the optimal value 
deducted from signal detection theory.
reward MagnItude BIaS
Figure 2 shows the results of the initial four reward magnitude 
sessions (fast, slow, rightward, and leftward bias). For all three 
animals the decision criteria in the biased condition differ from 
the one in the neutral condition. The optimal decision criterion 
predicted by signal detection theory is indicated by the gray lines. 
In most cases, the observed decision criteria are shifted farther 
than optimal.
To quantify the results we tested the four null-hypotheses H01–
H04 for every recording session (see Table 1). The results for H01 
indicate that in almost all cases (45/48), the decision criteria shifted 
significantly in the direction predicted from the reward asymme-
try. This finding provides very strong evidence for the assumption 
that reward magnitude manipulations have a strong effect on the 
sensory decision criteria.
H02 tested whether stimulus discriminability differed in the 
neutral and biased condition. In 31 out of 48 cases this was not the 
case. For 16 out of the remaining 17 cases, we observed a decrease in 
stimulus discriminability in the biased condition (see also Figure 2). 
Additional analyses indicated that all animals exhibited this trend. 
However, it was most pronounced for monkey L which also tended 
to show the strongest effect of reward magnitude on the shift of the 
decision criteria (see for example Figure 2 or Table 2).
Here φ indicates the density-function of a normal distribution. 
The first two terms together represent the non-sensory informa-
tion, i.e., the reward magnitude and the prior reward likelihood of 
an option. The third term represents the sensory information, i.e., 
given the sensory evidence, how likely is option one or two to be 
the correct one. The cutoff c which optimizes expected reward can 
be found by equating the expected value for the two options:
E c E c1 2( ) ( )=  (4)
r P s s
c s
1 1
1( )= −
unconditional
expected value
of option 1
   φ σ

 = =
−
r P s s
c s
2 2
2
( )
unconditional
expected value
of option
   φ
2
σ




 
(5)
In this form it is easy to appreciate that changing the reward 
magnitudes, i.e., r
1/2
 has the same effect as changing the reward 
likelihood priors, i.e., P(s = s
1/2
). Further, we can define r
1/2
P(s = s
1/2
) 
as the unconditional expected values of the two options which are 
known before the visual stimuli come on. Based on this definition, 
we can conclude that the optimal decision criterion is a function 
of the unconditional expected value.
In the current experiment we used six different speeds sym-
metrically spaced around the cutoff speed: s
i
 = s
c
 ± δ
1,2,3
. Equation 4 
can easily be expanded to accommodate this situation:
rP s s
c s
rP s s
c s
i i
i
i
i i
i
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∑ ∑
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(6)
Here rs sc<  denotes the reward associated with a correct “slow” 
categorization and vice verse. For a more detailed treatment see 
Feng et al. (2009). In the current context we determined the optimal 
shift c that solves Eq. 6 numerically.
reSultS
The aim of our experiment was to investigate sensory decision 
criteria of macaque monkeys when they choose between response 
alternatives differing with respect to reward magnitude or prior 
reward likelihood. For each experimental session, we analyzed 
two groups of trials: the block of neutral trials completed prior 
to the introduction of the biased reward schedule and the block 
of biased trials. We excluded the trials immediately following the 
introduction of the new reward schedule to allow some time for 
adjusting the decision criteria to the new reward contingencies. The 
minimum learning cutoff we used was 100 trials. In conditions for 
which a large number of biased trials were available we also tested 
the effect of excluding more trials (up to 600 trials). No qualitative 
differences were found.
Using nested likelihood tests described in section “Materials 
and Methods” we tested the following null-hypotheses for every 
recording session: (H01) The monkeys do not shift their decision 
criterion in response to the manipulations of reward contingen-
cies, i.e., the decision criterion in the neutral and biased condition 
are identical: PSE
n
 = PSE
b
. (H02) The stimulus discriminability 
does not change in the biased compared to the neutral condition: 
Table 1 | Summary of the reward magnitude and reward likelihood 
experiments.
 Magnitude bias Likelihood bias
 Category Direction Category Direction
 H01 23 / 1 / 0 : 24 22 / 1 / 1 : 24 0 / 4 / 0 : 4 0 / 4 / 0 : 4
 PSEn = PSEb
 H02 10 / 14 / 0 : 24  6 / 17 / 1 : 24 1 / 3 / 0 : 4 3 / 1 / 0 : 4
	σn = σb # “<” / “ns” / “>” : total
 H03 5 / 14 / 5 : 24  6 / 11 / 7 : 24 0 / 3 / 1 : 4 0 / 3 / 1 : 4
 PSEn = optimal # “>” / “ns” / “<” : total
 H04 24 / 0 / 0 : 24 23 / 0 / 1 : 24 0 / 2 / 2 : 4 0 / 0 / 4 : 4
PSEb = optimal # “>” / “ns” / “<” : total 
The four numbers in each individual cell correspond to the results of the 
nested hypothesis test. The first and third number indicate the number 
of instances when the test statistic was significantly larger and smaller 
than expected under the null hypothesis, respectively. The third number 
corresponded to the number of non-significant instances. Finally, the fourth 
number corresponded to the total number tests. In H01 the test statistic 
was constructed such that the first number indicates the instances when 
the direction of the difference in decision criteria was consistent with the 
ideal observer performance. In H02, the first number indicates the instances 
for which σb was larger than σn, i.e., when stimulus discriminability dropped 
in the block of biased trials. In H03 the first number corresponds to the 
instances when PSEn was significantly smaller than 5.5 pix/frame. Finally, in 
H04, the first number corresponds to the number of times the shift in PSE 
is larger than optimal.
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the optimal shift. Thus, the observed overcompensation cannot 
be attributed to reduced stimulus discriminability in the biased 
condition. Figure 5 illustrates the deviations from optimality in 
the neutral as well as the magnitude bias condition.
Further, we analyzed the impact of this overcompensation on the 
average reward magnitude. To that aim we estimated the expected 
reward magnitude that would be obtained using the optimal deci-
sion criterion and compared it with the expected reward magnitude 
predicted from the measured decision criterion. Table 2 reports 
the fraction of the expected reward magnitude using the actual 
and the optimal decision criterion. By over-adjusting the decision 
criterion, the three monkeys lost on average 7, 6, and 4% of the 
possible reward magnitude, respectively.
prIor reward lIkelIhood BIaS
Figure 3 shows the results in the biased reward likelihood condition 
for two monkeys. As monkey C had exhibited a natural bias even 
in the absence any reward manipulation, he was excluded from 
the remainder of the experiment. In stark contrast to the biased 
reward magnitude condition, there seemed to be no effect of prior 
reward likelihood on the placement of the decision criteria. This 
observation is backed by the nested likelihood-ratio tests (Table 1). 
The results from H01 show that summed over both animals, sig-
nificant differences between the biased and the neutral condition 
were found in none of the eight cases. Similarly, the results from 
H04 indicate that the decision bound was placed significantly sub-
optimal in all eight instances. However, in contrast to the reward 
magnitude condition where the subjects shifted their criterion too 
far here they did not shift it far enough. Results from H02 and 
H03 do not seem to differ significantly from the ones found in the 
reward magnitude condition.
H03 tested whether the decision criteria were optimal, i.e., at 
5.5 pix/frame, in the block of neutral trials. In 25 out of 48 ses-
sions the placement of the decision criteria was not significantly 
different from optimal. Overall, there was no systematic trend for 
decision criterion to deviate from 5.5 pix/frame in a particular 
direction. This is in part due to the fact that monkey C which did 
exhibit a systematic tendency to misplace the decision criterion in 
the neutral condition only performed four sessions before being 
excluded from the experiment. The large percentage of significant 
deviations from optimality indicate non-systematic daily fluctua-
tions in the decision criteria. It is possible that these fluctuations are 
due to residual carry-over effects from the biased reward schedule 
presented on the previous day.
H04 tested the optimality of the decision criterion in the biased 
trial blocks. In 47 out of 48 instances, the observed shift of the 
decision criterion was significantly larger than the optimal shift. 
Note that the stimulus discriminability σ	tended to decrease in the 
blocks of biased trials (see H02). Hence, we used the lower stimulus 
discriminability in the biased block indicated by σ
b
 to estimate 
Table 2 | Fraction of actual and optimal reward volume that could have 
been earned with the optimal decision criterion. Especially in the 
magnitude bias condition monkeys loose a considerable amount due to the 
suboptimal integration of sensory and non-sensory information.
Fraction of Magnitude bias Likelihood bias 
optimal reward
Monkey K 0.94 0.99
Monkey L 0.93 0.98
Monkey C 0.96 NA
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Figure 2 | reward magnitude bias. Psychometric functions for the first four 
recording session in the reward magnitude condition: the black color 
corresponds to the neutral condition averaged over all 4 days. The red and green 
colors correspond to trials in the slow and fast category bias condition, 
respectively. In order to visualize the effect of the direction bias we separated 
the trials into two conditions: The so called “slow direction bias” condition 
incorporates all trials where the red target could be reached by a saccade in the 
biased direction, i.e., red target on the left side during leftward bias and red 
target on the right side during the rightward bias. Similarly, the “fast direction 
bias” condition corresponds to trials where the green target could be reached by 
a saccade in the biased direction. The orange and cyan color corresponds to the 
slow and fast direction bias, respectively. The box and whisker plots indicate 
confidence intervals of a bootstrap procedure (see Materials and Methods for 
details). The gray lines indicate the predictions of the ideal observer analysis 
which maximizes reward given the stimulus discriminability observed in the 
neutral condition. The results show a clear pattern: unbiased behavior in the 
neutral condition and large shifts of the PSE in the expected direction for the 
biased conditions.
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optimal shift. In contrast, for six out of eight instances in the 
reward likelihood condition, the observed shift is significantly 
smaller than the optimal shift. Figure 4B illustrates the tempo-
ral progression of the results. The lack of an adjustment of the 
decision criterion in the reward likelihood condition can not be 
attributed to a linear trend over time: Overcompensation in the 
reward magnitude condition was found both before and after the 
reward likelihood sessions.
Due to the suboptimal decision criteria, monkeys lost some frac-
tion of the possible reward volume. However, the losses were con-
siderable smaller than in the reward magnitude condition. Monkeys 
K and L lost 1 and 2%, respectively (see Table 2).
Figure 4 summarizes the main result regarding the differences 
between the reward magnitude and reward likelihood condition 
(see also Figure 5). In all but one of the cases, the observed shift 
in the reward magnitude condition is significantly larger than the 
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Figure 3 | reward likelihood bias. Psychometric functions for the first four recording session in the reward likelihood condition. Conventions as in Figure 2. In 
contrast to the reward magnitude condition, monkeys did not shift their PSE in the biased conditions.
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Figure 4 | Population analysis. (A) The observed shift of decision criterion 
(PSE – 5.5 pix/frame) is plotted as a function of the optimal shift which was 
calculated based on the stimulus discriminability observed the same day in the 
biased condition. The green and blue color corresponds to the reward magnitude 
and reward likelihood conditions, respectively. In the reward magnitude 
condition, the animals consistently shift their decision criterion farther than 
optimal. In contrast, the decision criterion does not shift systematically in the 
reward likelihood condition. (B) The fraction of observed and optimal shift as a 
function of temporal progression of the recording sessions aligned to the first 
reward likelihood session. For both monkeys we observed overcompensation in 
the reward magnitude condition prior to and after the sessions which failed to 
find any compensation for the reward likelihood condition.
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monkey L chose the favored option 63 and 26% more often than 
the other, respectively. Monkey K adjusted his choices consid-
erably faster than monkey L. Monkey L responded less to the 
reward likelihood manipulation, especially in the second half of 
the experiment. Instead his behavior was strongly biased toward 
his naturally preferred response option, a rightward saccade. 
Nevertheless, the results show that both monkeys responded 
robustly to the changes in reward likelihood. For 10 out of 11 
sessions we find that the animals choose the biased option signifi-
cantly more often in the biased block than in the neutral block of 
trials (two-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity 
correction, α = 0.05).
dIScuSSIon
In the current study we measured sensory decision criteria 
of macaque monkeys in response to manipulations of reward 
magnitude and prior reward likelihood favoring one of the 
two perceptual categories (“fast” or “slow”), or one of the two 
possible motor responses (leftward or rightward saccade). We 
report two main findings: first, decision criteria did shift in 
response to manipulations of reward magnitude. Ideal observer 
analysis showed that the observed shift was significantly larger 
than the value that would have optimized reward volume in the 
long run. Second, decision criteria did not shift in response to 
manipulations of prior reward likelihood. This is in clear con-
trast to human observers whose decision criteria are sensitive 
to changes in prior reward likelihood (e.g., Maddox, 2002). In 
the following we will discuss the implications of our findings 
in greater detail.
reward MagnItude VerSuS lIkelIhood BIaS
Our results show substantial and significant differences in 
the subjects’ decision criteria in response to manipulations of 
reward magnitude on the one hand and reward likelihood on 
the other. The decision criteria readily adjusted to the manipula-
tion of reward magnitude (see Figure 2). In our animals which 
had never before experienced the reward magnitude manipula-
tion, decision criteria began shifting within the first 100 trials 
(Figure 6). Within less than 200 trials the decision criterion 
reached a relatively stable level which was shifted significantly 
farther than predicted by an ideal observer model. The subop-
timal placement of the decision bound in the reward magni-
tude condition cost the monkeys on average 6% of the expected 
reward volume, even after accounting for decreased stimulus 
discriminability in the biased condition. This value is substan-
tially larger than the 1–2% reported previously in a related task 
(Feng et al., 2009).
In stark contrast, the decision criteria of the monkeys did not 
adjust to manipulations of prior reward likelihood (see Figure 3). 
This led to an average reduction in expected reward volume of 
2%. Even after up to 1000 trials with unequal reward likelihoods 
we failed to find any sign which might hint at a shift of decision 
criteria. Clearly, we can not rule out that such a shift would have 
developed if the same likelihood bias had been maintained for 
several thousands of trials distributed over multiple days. Similarly, 
our study does not exclude that the animals will eventually learn to 
adapt more optimal decision thresholds in both conditions as they 
Motor VerSuS category BIaS
In each of the biased reward conditions (biased magnitude and 
biased likelihood), the bias was applied either to response direction 
(left or right) or response category (fast or slow). Visual inspection 
of Figure 2 suggests that the effect of reward magnitude is larger 
in the category bias condition than in the direction bias condition. 
In fact, for the subset of sessions presented in Figure 2 this differ-
ence is significant for two of the monkeys. We further tested this 
assumption on the population level. To that aim we used a linear 
model to predict observed shift as a function of optimal shift. We 
tested whether the fit of this model is improved by allowing the 
slope to vary as a function of bias type, i.e., category or motor 
bias. Our results indicate clearly that this is not the case (p = 0.94). 
Overall, our results indicate that biased reward schedules have the 
same effects on the shift of decision criteria in category and motor 
bias conditions.
Value-BaSed decISIon taSk
In the biased sensory decision task we found a striking dissocia-
tion between the subjects’ response to the reward magnitude and 
reward likelihood manipulation. To assure that these differences 
were not due to a general insensitivity of the subjects to reward 
likelihood, we tested their behavior in a standard value-based 
decision task. We found that both subjects readily adjusted their 
behavior to changes of reward likelihood in this task. Figure 7 
shows how the subjects’ preference shifts toward the option that 
is twice as likely (80%) to be rewarded as the other option (40%). 
Averaging the responses from trial number 201 to 1200 after the 
introduction of the asymmetric reward schedule, monkey K and 
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Figure 5 | Deviation from the optimal decision criterion in the neutral, 
reward magnitude and reward likelihood condition. In the neutral 
condition there is no systematic deviation from optimality, despite 
considerable unsystematic variability. In the reward magnitude and the reward 
likelihood condition we do observes systematic deviation from optimality. In 
the magnitude bias condition subjects shift their decision criterion too far, i.e., 
they over-compensate. In contrast, they do not shift their decision criterion far 
enough in the likelihood bias condition, i.e., they under-compensate.
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probability emerges over multiple trials. However, it is important to 
note that the reward magnitude effect develops gradually over more 
than 100 trials, suggesting that reward magnitude is also evaluated 
over a longer time scale.
coMparISon Between huMan and Macaque oBSerVerS
A large body of literature has examined the phenomenology of 
biased sensory decision making in human observers: These studies 
investigated how subjects adjust their decision criteria in categori-
zation tasks with unequal reward magnitudes and/or prior reward 
likelihood (Busemeyer and Myung, 1992; Erev, 1998; Maddox, 2002; 
Voss et al., 2008; Feng et al., 2009; Navalpakkam et al., 2009). In 
the following, we want to relate our findings in macaque monkeys 
to the human literature in general and one very simple conceptual 
model in particular.
Several studies have shown that human subjects indeed adjust 
their decision criteria in response to both unequal reward mag-
nitudes and prior reward likelihoods. However, subjects are con-
servative and do not adjust their criterion far enough in order 
to optimize expected reward (Green and Swets, 1966; Healy and 
Kubovy, 1981). Further, several studies have shown that humans 
the gain more experience with the biased decision making task in 
general. However, this does not take away from our main finding 
which is that naive animals exhibit dramatically different responses 
to manipulations in reward magnitude on the one hand and prior 
reward likelihood on the other.
One possible explanation for the striking lack of an effect in 
response to the prior reward likelihood manipulation is that our 
subjects were insensitive to changes of reward likelihood in general, 
or that the differences in reward likelihood were too small to notice. 
However, our results from the value-based decision task show that 
this is not the case. In this task the subjects readily adjusted their 
behavior to differences in reward likelihood of the same magnitude. 
Hence, it seems more likely that the subjects failed to establish a 
connection between prior reward likelihood, decision criteria and 
reward maximization. This link may have been difficult to establish 
in the biased decision task, as there were two sources of informa-
tion indicating which of the two options was more likely to be cor-
rect: the sensory evidence evaluated on a trial by trial basis and the 
prior reward likelihood estimated over a large sample of trials. The 
sensory evidence may in some way have prevented the use of the 
prior reward likelihood information. It is possible that differences 
in reward magnitude are more salient than differences in reward 
likelihood: reward size is experienced immediately while reward 
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Figure 6 | Decision criteria as a function of time from the introduction of 
the biased reward schedule. For each speed we calculated moving averages 
of percent “fast” choices as a function of time from the onset of the biased 
reward schedule. The moving average was calculated with a box-car kernel of 
±25 trials. We fit a psychometric function to the data from each time-point in 
the moving average. Here we show the time-resolved PSE of the fitted 
functions. For both monkeys in both bias conditions, the decision criteria start 
moving in the predicted direction immediately after the introduction of the 
biased reward schedule. They reach a reasonably stable level after about 200 
trials. Note that the graph averages over all trials of a given monkey and 
condition. Hence, a single line comprises data of e.g., the “fast” and “slow” 
category bias regardless of the reward asymmetry used on that particular day 
(4 versus 2 or 4 versus 3, or 3 versus 2 valve openings). These different 
conditions are balanced only for the first 600 trials.
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Figure 7 | results from the value-based decision task. The proportion of 
choices in favor of the biased response is plotted separately for the neutral and 
the biased blocks. Data from a particular bias type are connected by a dotted 
line. The plotting symbol and line type indicate the subject. In every single 
session, subjects shifted their preferences in favor of the response that was 
more likely to be correct. On most days this effect was quite strong and 
caused the monkeys to choose the biased response 80% of the time or more. 
On some days, however, the effect was rather small. This seemed to be the 
case when an animal already had a very strong bias, e.g., toward a particular 
direction and the likelihood manipulation favored a particular color. Further, 
while both monkeys responded to the reward likelihood manipulations, 
monkey K responded stronger and with a shorter delay than monkey L. As 
monkey K already had a very strong natural rightward preference, we did not 
run the rightward bias condition. The response bias in the neutral block is 
caused mainly by carry-over effects from the bias introduced on the 
previous day.
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wρ for the reward criterion. However, the lack of an effect in the 
reward likelihood condition would suggest negligible weights for 
both accuracy and reward maximization.
It is possible to expand the COBRA hypothesis in order to 
accommodate the behavior of the macaques. We will refer to this 
extension more generally as the criteria competition approach. 
Parallel to the accuracy criterion shift we define the magnitude 
criterion shift ∆c
M 
as a function of reward magnitude:
∆c f
r
rM
s s
s s
c
c
= 



<
>
σ
 
(10)
Just as the accuracy criterion c
A
 maximizes reward under the 
assumption of equal payoffs, the magnitude criterion c
M
 maximizes 
reward under the assumption of equal base rates. Note that nei-
ther of the two criteria optimize reward if base rates and payoffs 
are unequal at the same time. In such cases, the expected reward 
criterion c
R
 is the only optimal choice. In the criterion competition 
model, the actual criterion c arises as the weighted average of all 
three criteria:
c s w c w c w cc A R M= + + +α ρ µ∆ ∆ ∆  (11)
Behavior of the macaques in our task can be emulated by set-
ting w
μ
 to a value larger than 1 and fixing both wα and wρ to 0 (e.g., 
wα = 0, wρ = 0, wμ = 2). The behavior of the human subjects can 
of course also be expressed in this larger framework. Due to the 
additional degree of freedom, there are a number of combinations 
of coefficients which can emulate the human behavior.
category VerSuS Motor BIaS
Categorization tasks used in macaques typically confound percep-
tual category with the motor response used to signal this category 
(Feng et al., 2009). Hence, a bias in favor of a perceptual category, 
may actually be represented as a motor bias favoring a particular 
motor response. So far, it is not known whether the neural mecha-
nisms and the psychophysical effects of a category bias are identical 
to those of a motor bias. Thus, if humans acquired a category bias 
as favored by their instructions, and the monkeys a motor bias, the 
difference between the two species may actually reflect a difference 
between motor and category bias.
We tested this hypothesis by investigating whether decision 
bounds are affected equally by a motor and a category bias. We used 
a simple experimental procedure to dissociate category membership 
from motor response. This enabled us to compare the effects of a 
motor to a category bias. Overall, our results do not support the idea 
that category and motor biases have distinct effects on the placement 
of decision bounds. The initial finding of larger shifts in the cat-
egory compared to the motor bias condition (Figure 2) could not be 
replicated later in the experiment. In summary, our results indicate 
that differences between human and macaque subjects can not be 
attributed to differences between motor and category biases.
oVercoMpenSatIon In the reward MagnItude condItIon
In the following we will focus on the overcompensation which was 
consistently observed in the reward magnitude condition. First, we 
will review the mechanisms that have been put forward to explain 
the under-compensation of humans in similar tasks and explore 
place their  decision criteria closer to the optimal criterion when 
faced with unequal prior reward likelihoods rather than unequal 
reward magnitudes (reviewed for example in Maddox, 2002).
Macaque monkeys and humans behave similar only in response 
to the reward magnitude manipulation: both species shift their 
decision criteria in response to such manipulations. However, 
while human subjects under-compensate, i.e., they do not shift 
their decision criteria far enough, macaques over-compensate (see 
Figures 2 and 4 as well as Feng et al., 2009). In contrast, the most 
pronounced interspecies differences can be observed in the prior 
reward likelihood condition: while human subjects show large and 
close to optimal shifts in this condition, macaques failed to show 
any significant shift in our biased decision task.
These clear differences suggest that different mechanisms 
underlie the adjustment of decision bounds in the two species. In 
the following we will relate our results to a very simple concep-
tual model which has been put forward to explain the behavior 
of human subjects in similar tasks: the so-called competition-
between-reward-and-accuracy (COBRA) hypothesis holds that 
decision criteria arise as a compromise between accuracy and 
reward maximization.
The amount ∆c
A
 by which decision criteria need to be shifted 
from the actual category bound s
c
 in order to maximize accuracy 
is a function of the prior reward likelihoods, i.e., the base rates of 
the different categories:
∆c f P s c
P s cA
= <
>



σ
( )
( )  
(7)
The criterion value c
A
 is the sum of actual category bound s
c
, and 
the optimal accuracy criterion shift: c
A
 = s
c
 + ∆c
A
. The index σ indi-
cates that the optimal shift also depends on how well an observer is 
able to discriminate the different stimuli. The precise form of the 
functional relationship fσ is given by Eq. 6. The criterion shift ∆cR 
which maximizes reward volume is a function of unconditional 
expected values:
∆c f
r P s c
r P s cR
s s
s s
c
c
=
<
>

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
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>
σ
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The COBRA hypothesis assumes that the actual criterion shift 
∆c is the weighted average of ∆c
A
 and ∆c
R
. Consequently, the cri-
terion c is given by:
c s w c w cc A R= + +α ρ∆ ∆  (9)
In this context, behavior of human subjects can be approxi-
mated by setting both coefficients to non-zero values with a sum 
of less than 1 (e.g., wα = 0.2, wρ = 0.7). In the reward likelihood 
condition, ∆c
A
 is identical to ∆c
R
. Consequently, wα and wρ add up 
to close to one, and lead to an almost optimal decision criterion. 
In the reward magnitude condition the two goals are mutually 
exclusive, i.e., ∆c
R
 > ∆c
A
 = 0. Hence wα and wR do not add up and 
cause a smaller and clearly suboptimal shift (see Maddox, 2002 
for details). The behavior of the macaques in our task can not be 
explained in this framework of competition between accuracy and 
reward maximization: the strong effects of the reward magnitude 
manipulation on decision criteria would suggest a large coefficient 
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whether these mechanisms may account for the overcompensation 
found in monkeys. Further, we will discuss two new approaches 
which are based on the decision confidence and an alternative opti-
mization strategy which we refer to as operant matching.
Utility function
One possible explanation of the monkeys’ overcompensation is based 
on the assumption that subjects maximize utility of the rewards, not 
reward volume per se. In addition, different shapes of the utility 
functions for the two species may explain the different behavior 
of human and macaque observers in such tasks. For example, if 
human subjects have a concave utility function, they will value big 
rewards relatively less, and the shift which optimizes expected util-
ity is smaller than the one that optimizes expected reward. Indeed, 
humans show signs of concave utility functions in a number of situ-
ations (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Additional support for 
this mechanism has been presented by Navalpakkam et al. (2009). 
When they encouraged human subjects to interpret rewards linearly 
by adding an extra cash prize for the subject with the best perform-
ance, they observed optimal criterion shifts.
Similarly, this mechanism may be responsible for the subopti-
mally large criterion shifts observed for the monkeys. However, in 
contrast to the concave utility function which explains the under-
compensation of the humans, their overcompensation needs to be 
explained by convex utility functions. We rewrite Eq. 6 and replace 
the rewards r
i
 with the utility of these rewards as denoted by u[r
i
]. 
In addition, we replace the variable decision criterion c with the 
observed decision criterion, i.e., PSE. We exploit the fact that at the 
PSE, the expected utility of both choices is equal:
u r P s s
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u r
s s c
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s s
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We approximate u[r] as an exponential function: u[r] = rq. Hence 
we can rewrite Eq. 12:
u r
u r
r
r
p c
p c
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Since the right hand side of Eq. 13 can be estimated from the 
psychophysical performance in the neutral condition (see Materials 
and Methods), it will give us an estimate of the fraction of the 
utilities that would have justified the observed shift of the decision 
criterion. This fraction can be compared to the fraction of the actual 
reward values, r
1
/r
2
. To do this, we solve Eq. 13 for the exponent q 
which will give us an estimate of the convexity or concavity of the 
utility function:
q
p c p c
r r
= ( )( )
log ( )/ ( )
log /
2 1
1 2
For the three monkeys L, K, and C we find very similar exponents 
q of 5.15 ± 2.36, 5.23 ± 2.59, and 4.21 ± 3.54 (mean ± standard devia-
tion). With the exception of a single data point from monkey C, all 
estimates of q are larger than 2, indicating a strong convexity in the 
utility function. These analyses show that in principle, the subop-
timally large criterion shifts of the monkeys may be explained by 
convex utility functions. This interpretation is supported by other 
studies presenting evidence in favor of convex utility functions for 
fluid rewards in monkeys (McCoy and Platt, 2005; Hayden et al., 
2008). However, the value of the exponent q which was estimated 
to be on the order of 5 seems rather large.
We further performed an independent test of whether our mon-
keys exhibit evidence in favor of convex utility functions within the 
particular setting of our task. In order to do so, subjects performed 
the identical speed-categorization task with a slightly modified 
reward schedule. Correct responses for one of the categories were 
always rewarded with a fixed number of 3 valve openings. The other 
category was rewarded randomly with either 2 or 4 valve openings. 
If the monkeys have convex utility functions, they should prefer the 
variable option with a 50% chance of either 2 or 4 valve openings 
over the fixed one. Sensory decision criteria of one of the animals 
(monkey K) shifted in line with these predictions. The other animal 
(monkey L), however, was indifferent to the two reward schedules. 
In summary, the overcompensation of the monkeys may at least 
in part be related to a convex utility function for fluid rewards 
delivered in units of valve openings.
Confidence estimate
The optimal criterion that maximizes reward depends not only on 
the fraction of reward magnitudes, but also on the discriminability 
of the stimuli, σ (see Eq. 6): If the discriminability of the stimuli 
is low, i.e., σ is large and the psychometric function is flat, the 
optimal shift is large (see Figure 4). Hence, in order to produce an 
optimal criterion shift, the monkeys need to have a good estimate 
of σ. In the following we assume that the animals representation 
of stimulus discriminability is given by σˆ. We can reformulate Eq. 6 
by substituting σˆ for σ and the observed PSE for the optimal cri-
terion shift c.
r P s s
s
r P s s
s
s s c
i
i
s s c
i
i
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In most cases, Eq. 14 can be solved numerically for σˆ. However, 
no solution exists if the sign of the observed shift of the decision 
criterion does match the sign of the optimal shift. For monkey L, 
averaged over all conditions, we find that a σˆ of 4.08 ± 1.03 explains 
the observed criterion placement. Compared to an actual value of 
stimulus discriminability of σ = 1.44 ± 0.40, this would corresponds 
to a pronounced underestimation of the psychophysical ability. For 
monkey K, the estimated value is ˆ . .σ = ±2 19 0 29, compared to an 
actual value of σ = 0.88 ± 0.28. For monkey C, Eq. 14 can not be 
solved in one instance. Averaged over the remaining instances we 
find an estimated value is ˆ . .σ = ±5 84 1 67, compared to an actual 
value of σ = 2.20 ± 1.20. This analysis suggests that overcompensa-
tion of the monkeys may in principle be due to a systematic under-
estimation of the monkeys’ psychophysical ability to discriminate 
the stimulus speeds.
The previous two sections have outlined that our results can be 
explained either by convex utility functions or under-confidence 
of the monkeys in their decision. A recent study by Kiani and 
Shadlen (2009) may help determine which of the two explanations 
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For all three monkeys, the global matching criterion predicted 
larger shifts than the criterion which optimizes rewards, c
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. Hence, 
the differences between humans and monkeys may at least partially 
be caused by monkeys placing larger weight w
O
 on the operant 
matching criterion.
concluSIon
In the current experiment we investigated sensory decision crite-
ria of macaque monkeys in a biased decision making task where 
different options were more likely to be correct (prior reward 
likelihood bias) or associated with a larger reward if chosen cor-
rectly (reward magnitude bias). Our results show that decision 
criteria of naive monkeys over-adjust to the reward magnitude 
manipulation but fail to adjust at all to the reward likelihood 
manipulation. Importantly, the setting of decision criteria does 
not seem to be mediated by the unconditional expected value 
of the options as predicted by an ideal observer analysis. Rather, 
conditional reward magnitude alone determines the decision 
criteria of the monkeys in the task. This is in clear contrast to 
choice behavior in pure value-based decisions where the monkeys 
readily adjusted their behavior as a function of prior reward 
likelihood.
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is more likely to be accurate. In their study, monkeys engaged in a 
post-decision wagering task: After signaling their choice, monkeys 
were given an additional choice between sticking to their origi-
nal, potentially wrong choice and a third option which featured 
a smaller but sure reward. Behavior in the post-decision wager is 
indicative of the confidence in their original choice: if they are 
sure about their decision, they should stick with the big prospec-
tive reward, if not, they might want to go with the small but sure 
reward. Similar to our task, it is possible to asses the optimality 
of the monkeys’ decisions strategy. Their analyses suggest that the 
behavior of the monkeys can be explained either by a convex utility 
function or overconfidence of the monkeys in their performance. 
Note that both, ours and their data set can be explained by convex 
utility functions. In contrast, erroneous confidence estimates do 
not provide a parsimonious explanation for both data sets: our 
data needs to be explained by under-confidence of the subjects, 
theirs by overconfidence. Taken together, the two studies seem to 
suggest that convex utility functions are more likely than errone-
ous confidence estimates to play a role in causing the observed 
suboptimal behavior.
Operant matching criterion
The COBRA hypothesis and its extension, the criteria competi-
tion approach, have already been discussed in section “Comparison 
between human and macaque observers.” In summary, we con-
cluded that only the criteria competition approach may accom-
modate the findings from the two species.
Here, we will consider an additional expansion of the criterion 
competition approach which provides a novel explanation for the 
overcompensation observed for the monkeys. The explanation is 
based on the matching law first formulated by Herrnstein (1961). 
Hence, we refer to the mechanism as operant matching as opposed 
to the local “winner-take-all” mechanism which governs the behav-
ior of the ideal observer. We define the value of a category, V(C
i
), as 
the likelihood of being correct when choosing this category times 
the reward magnitude associated with this category:
V C P r1 2 1 21 2/ /" | " / "( ) = =( )correct" choice  (15)
The idea of operant matching is that the decision criterion is 
set such that the value of each category is equal:
V C V C1 2( ) = ( )  (16)
Note that operant matching will produce category boundaries 
which can be quite distinct from the ideal observer analysis. For 
example, assume that the task is very easy and subjects perform 
virtually 100% correct. In this case, the ideal observer analysis holds 
that the criterion should not be shifted at all. However, if the cri-
terion is not shifted, the values of the two categories as defined 
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